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Tonight my topic is the next great copyright act, but before I speak about the 
future, I would like to talk a little about the past, including the role of the Copyright 
Office in past revision activities.  In my remarks, I will address the need for 
comprehensive review and revision of U.S. copyright law, identify the most 
significant issues, and suggest a framework by which Congress should weigh the 
public interest, which includes the interests of authors.  I will also address the 
necessary evolution of the Copyright Office itself. 
Those of you who have been to our offices in Washington know that we have a 
conference room featuring portraits of the former Registers of Copyright dating 
back to 1897.1  When guests are seated at our table, the former Registers preside on 
high, wearing a variety of expressions and overseeing complex conversations about 
copyright law in the digital age.  Sometimes I think they would be startled by the 
discussions we have, but then again it might all sound familiar. 
SOLBERG (1897–1930) 
Thorvald Solberg was the first and longest serving Register of Copyrights.  He 
seems inspired in his portrait, and for good reason.  Solberg was a visionary leader, 
a champion of authors’ rights, and an early advocate for the United States’ 
adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (“Berne Convention”).2  Under his care, the Copyright Office grew from a 
handful of employees to more than one hundred professional staff and took on the 
many roles that are still critical to the mission of the Office today.  Solberg and his 
team administered the copyright registration system, managed the public records of 
 
*
       Maria A. Pallante is Register of Copyrights of the United States and Director of the U.S 
Copyright Office.  This is an extended version of the Twenty-Sixth Horace S. Manges Lecture delivered 
on March 4, 2013 at Columbia Law School.  The author would like to recognize the dedicated public 
service of the past and present staff members of the U.S. Copyright Office.  Citations are omitted where 
the author draws on personal knowledge. 
 1. The United States Copyright Office is located on Capitol Hill in the James Madison Memorial 
Building of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC.  Images of the portraits described herein are 
available for viewing at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/2013MangesLectureSlides.pdf (last visited Apr. 
5, 2013). 
 2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised 
July 24, 1971 and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the 
United States Mar. 1, 1989). 
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copyright information, facilitated the delivery of books and other copyright 
deposits to the Library of Congress (the “Library”), served as substantive experts 
within the U.S. government, provided policy advice to Congress, and represented 
the United States at international meetings.3  He was Register during the revision 
process that led to the 1909 Act, in which copyright term was extended to a total 
period of fifty-six years subject to renewal registration, but he broached the subject 
of automatic protection as early as the 1920s.4 
KAMINSTEIN (1960–1971) 
Abraham (Abe) Kaminstein was Register during another key period for 
copyright revision.  In his portrait, he stands in front of his law books, looking 
knowledgeable and perhaps a little impatient.  He spent eleven years working with 
Congress and with stakeholders on revision issues, presiding over roundtables and 
legal studies and helping to mold many of the provisions that were enacted in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act” or “Copyright Act”).  In fact, the revision 
process began in the 1950s, during Arthur Fisher’s tenure as Register, and did not 
conclude until five years after Kaminstein’s departure, when Barbara Ringer was 
Register.5 
What might be obvious today, but nonetheless is instructive, is that the long 
revision process that led to the 1976 Act reflected a spectrum of issues, from small 
or technical fixes to wholly new or controversial provisions.  Small decisions were 
important then, as they can be now, because they added a degree of certainty to the 
statute, making it more user-friendly for those who need to interpret and rely upon 
its provisions.  An example is the decision in 1976 to set the end of the copyright 
term on the last day of the calendar year.6 
More tedious were the issues where policy consensus was achieved in principle, 
but later compromised or undermined by overnegotiation.  A good example here is 
termination.7  In copyright, the concept of termination is rooted in the equitable 
principle that authors should share in the long-term value of their works.  The 
policy is sound, but the provisions as enacted are almost incomprehensible on their 
face, particularly for the authors, widows, widowers, children and other heirs who 
need to navigate them. 
The termination provisions are important for another reason, however.  They 
show that Congress sometimes will migrate policy principles into a new context.  
In the 1976 Act, Congress was moving to a singular and significantly longer term 
 
 3. See generally 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1.41 (2013); see also John Y. 
Cole, Of Copyright, Men and a National Library, 28 Q.J. LIBR. CONG. 114, 134 (1971).  
 4. See Thorvald Solberg, The Present Copyright Situation, 40 YALE L.J. 184, 195 (1930). 
 5. See PATRY, supra note 3, § 1.72.   
 6. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, a copyright expired twenty-eight years (or fifty-six years if the 
copyright was renewed) after the date of first publication with notice or after the date of registration (in 
the case of unpublished works).  See 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1978).  Under the current 
statute, copyright expires at the end of the calendar year in the year of expiration.  See 17 U.S.C. § 305 
(2012). 
 7. 17 U.S.C §§ 203, 304. 
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of protection, and phasing out the renewal periods and renewal registration 
requirement in the law.  At the same time, Congress recognized that the renewal 
period had provided authors with a legal trigger to renegotiate problematic 
licensing terms with their publishers and producers.8  Thus, in crafting the 
termination provisions, Congress was acknowledging the need for a new legal 
framework, but also was carrying over and reinventing a compelling policy 
objective.9 
Of course, the 1976 Act generated many discussions about exceptions and 
limitations, and if today’s climate is any indication, they were not without 
complexity or controversy.  Questions before Congress included whether and how 
to incorporate significant judicial doctrines into the statute, and whether and how to 
provide special treatment and specific guidance to discrete communities.  Congress 
would codify the fair use doctrine, reaffirm the first sale doctrine, and create 
specific exceptions for libraries and archives.10  But Congress would choose to 
defer any specific exceptions for educational use, concluding that such a treatment 
“is not justified.”11  These decisions reflect the work ethic of Congress when 
legislating copyright law for a new era.  Congress looks to the equities of the 
statute as a whole and not just to the immediate interests before it. 
Finally, and again instructively, there were deliberations on an array of topics 
that shifted and departed from the previous legal framework and therefore were at 
the more challenging end of the revision spectrum.  In the end, Congress would 
codify divisibility, extend the copyright term12 (a policy change strongly supported, 
incidentally, by Horace Manges13), and relax formalities.14  In doing so, Congress 
was adapting the law to the times.  It was not exactly fashioning solutions out of 
whole cloth, but it did a tremendous job in blending the world standards and 
pressures of global copyright law with the particular principles and practices of 
 
 8. This was more theoretical than practical, as many authors bargained away the renewal interest 
in advance.  But see Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 235–36 (1990) (holding that derivative work rights 
for renewal terms did not belong to assignees with which the author had earlier contracted because the 
author died before the renewal date). 
 9. Congress also considered restricting the duration of licenses, for example, by limiting an 
author’s license to periods of no more than ten years at a time.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RENEWAL 
OF COPYRIGHT, STUDY NO. 31 209 (1961) [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STUDY NO. 31]. 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–109 (1976). 
 11. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66–67 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. 
 12. Article 7 of the Berne Convention requires a minimum term of protection of fifty years 
following the death of the author.  The United States’ term extension put the country more on par with 
the sixty-four countries that were already Berne members in 1976.  See World Intellectual Prop. Org. 
(WIPO), Contracting Parties:  Berne Convention, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
 13. Horace Manges specifically says: 
The most important improvement would be a single term of copyright.  Life of the author plus a 
50 year term would have certain advantages, among them that the whole body of an author’s 
work (including revisions) would go out of copyright at the same time and that there would be a 
uniformity with the system utilized in leading European countries. 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY NO. 30 93 (1961).  
 14. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 405, 406 (1976) (providing that errors in a copyright notice or the 
omission of a copyright notice would not necessarily invalidate the copyright in a published work). 
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American democracy. 
RINGER (REGISTER 1973–1980/ACTING REGISTER 1993–1994) 
In 1973, Barbara Ringer, a Copyright Office lawyer who was already heavily 
involved in the revision process, became Register.  Like Kaminstein, she worked 
closely with congressional leadership, including long-time copyright steward 
Robert Kastenmeier, who was deeply involved in much of the 1976 revision 
process while he was Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property and the Administration of Justice, and Senator John McClellan, who was 
also very involved in all aspects of the reform effort as Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.15  Ringer and her team were involved in resolving last minute 
negotiations of the new law, documenting the significant legislative history, and 
implementing sweeping changes to the registration practices and related operations 
of the Copyright Office. 
Ringer’s portrait is very formal.  Staring into the distance, she looks elegant but 
pensive, and perhaps a little concerned.  Ringer was a staunch protector of authors 
and their role in a civilized society, and she began to worry about the future of the 
law, including what she saw as a growing effort by some to erode the copyright 
system by attempting to cast it as an obstacle rather than as a means to the 
dissemination of knowledge.  She wrote passionately about this in her well known 
article “The Demonology of Copyright.”16 
PETERS (1994–2010) 
Ringer was not wrong that copyright discussions were changing, both in 
complexity and tone, and she was not wrong to be uneasy.  By the time my 
predecessor Marybeth Peters became Register in 1994, the world was well on its 
way to unprecedented technological change and therefore dramatic upheaval for 
copyright markets and copyright law.  The times required Congress to act more 
boldly than before, not only to affirm core principles of copyright protection but 
also to provide guidance and direction to good faith intermediaries.  The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), enacted in 1998, was innovative in this 
regard.17  Among other things, it created a notice-and-takedown procedure for 
copyright owners and online intermediaries, a corresponding safe harbor from 
liability,18 and legal protection for technological protection measures.19 
 
 15. Rep. Kastenmeier served in the House of Representatives from January 3, 1959 to January 3, 
1991 and was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of 
Justice from 1969 to 1990.  Senator McClellan represented the State of Arkansas in the Senate from 
1942 until his death in 1977.  He served on a number of committees and his greatest contribution 
arguably was his work on the Judiciary Committee, which included a complete overhaul of the criminal 
code (in addition to comprehensive copyright reform). 
 16. See BARBARA A. RINGER, THE DEMONOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT:  SECOND OF THE R.R. 
BOWKER MEMORIAL LECTURES (R.R. Bowker Co. 1974). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
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As is the case today in matters of complex copyright policy, passage of the 
DMCA harnessed expertise from throughout the government.20  The Clinton 
Administration negotiated the Internet treaties and released a series of papers for 
public discussion, Congress negotiated their implementation into U.S. law, and a 
number of amendments were entrusted to the Copyright Office to administer, 
including a rulemaking procedure to address the intersection of the 
anticircumvention provisions and noninfringing uses. 
By the way, Peters is fittingly optimistic in her portrait. 
I.  WHY IT IS TIME FOR REVISION 
In American copyright law, there have been revisions and then there have been 
revisions.  As a general matter, Congress introduces bills, directs studies, conducts 
hearings, and discusses copyright policy on a fairly regular basis, and it has done so 
for two centuries.  But revision of the comprehensive sort is an entirely different 
matter.  It requires a clear and forward-thinking set of goals and a sustained 
commitment from Congress, most certainly over multiple sessions.  As Solberg 
observed in 1926, there comes a time when the “subject ought to be dealt with as a 
whole, and not by further merely partial or temporizing amendments.”21 
In general, major copyright revisions require Members of Congress, especially 
the committee leaders who are responsible for the governance of intellectual 
property, and their staffs to have a meaningful degree of fluency in the substance of 
copyright law.  While high level or even philosophical discussions do have a place 
in policy discussions, amending the law eventually comes down to the negotiation 
of complex and sometimes arcane provisions of the statute.  Some of these 
provisions are challenging for copyright experts, let alone for elected officials who 
have a multitude of other national and international responsibilities.  Add to this the 
intensity with which interested parties across the copyright spectrum sometimes 
make their views known—and the public’s confusion, if not aversion, when it 
comes to copyright issues22—and it is little wonder that Congress has moved 
slowly in the copyright space. 
A.  RECENT YEARS 
In terms of enacted legislation, Congress primarily has made minor adjustments 
 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 20. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure:  A Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, 
CONSERVATION ONLINE (July 1994), http://cool.conservation-us.org/bytopic/intprop/ipwg/; Information 
Infrastructure Task Force, Global Information Infrastructure:  Agenda for Cooperation, NAT’L 
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN (June 1, 1995), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1995/global-information-
infrastructure-agenda-cooperation. 
 21. Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 62 (1926). 
 22. See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 
61–62 (2002) (“I have a theory about how copyright got a bad name for itself, and I can summarize it in 
one word:  Greed.  Corporate greed and consumer greed.”). 
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or technical corrections in recent years.  Consider, for example, the Copyright 
Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010,23 the Satellite Television 
Extension and Localism Act of 2010,24 the Temporary Extension Act of 2010,25 
followed by the Continuing Extension Act of 2010,26 and three webcaster 
settlement acts in 2002, 2008 and 2009.27 
Where Congress was able to act more substantively, its focus was directed at the 
growing problem of piracy in the digital environment—for example, the ART Act 
of 2005,28 which addressed camcording in movie theatres, and the PRO-IP Act of 
2008, which enhanced certain civil remedies and criminal sanctions, improved 
funding and resources for several federal enforcement programs, and created the 
position of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (“IPEC”).29 
Certainly, Congress is acting responsibly when it makes discrete adjustments to 
the copyright law from time to time, but its more valuable role always has come 
from reviewing and addressing, as appropriate, the larger policy themes and 
developments that require attention.  In this regard, the last sustained period of 
copyright activity was fifteen years ago, a period that produced the DMCA and the 
Copyright Term Extension Act,30 as well as concomitant changes to the library and 
archives exception.  During this time, Congress, though legislating in a charged 
atmosphere, acted on copyright policy with authority, leaving a very visible and 
far-reaching imprint on the development of both law and commerce.  In the age of 
the Internet, where technology can so quickly affect the creation and 
communication of creative materials, these global reviews may need to happen 
more frequently, at least if the statute remains as dense and detailed as it is today. 
B.  PREPARATORY WORK 
The next great copyright act would not require Congress to start from scratch, 
because it has put in motion a steady stream of preparatory work on core issues 
since 1998.  For example, Congress has had more than a decade of debate on the 
public performance right for sound recordings,31 and it has given serious 
 
 23. Pub. L. No. 111-295, 124 Stat. 3180 (2010). 
 24. Pub. L. No. 111-175, 124 Stat. 1218 (2010). 
 25. Pub. L. No. 111-144, 124 Stat. 42 (2010). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 111-157, 124 Stat. 1116 (2010). 
 27. Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (further amending 17 
U.S.C. § 114 to authorize a thirty-day negotiation period for webcasters and copyright holders); 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 114); 
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 
114). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005). 
 29. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-403, 122 Stat. 4256. 
 30. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 31. See, e.g., The Performance Rights Act and Parity among Music Delivery Platforms:  Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights); Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation:  Updating the Performance Right and Platform 
Parity for the 21st Century:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register 
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consideration to improving the way in which musical works are licensed in the 
marketplace.32  These issues are ripe for resolution. 
Similarly, Congress has requested that the Copyright Office prepare a number of 
formal studies and analyses and conduct public inquiries and roundtables on 
important issues.  Although none of these were undertaken for the purpose of a 
comprehensive revision, they provide Congress with a fair amount of background 
on issues that would be relevant to the next great copyright act.  Consider the 
following Copyright Office studies, for example: 
 An early report on the issue of digital first sale;33 
 A major study and ongoing recommendations on orphan works solutions;34 
 Multiple reports on reforming or possibly eliminating the statutory licenses 
for cable and satellite retransmission under sections 111, 119 and 122;35 
 An analysis of termination provisions in the context of pre-1978 contracts;36 
 An analysis of the legal and business issues relating to mass digitization;37 
 A report on the federalization of protection for pre-1972 sound recordings;38 
 A pending analysis on the propriety of a resale royalty for visual artists;39 
and 
 
of Copyrights); Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts:  Balancing the Interests of Sound Recording 
Copyright Owners with those of Broadcasters:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th  Cong. (2004) (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
 32. Congress has introduced legislation and held multiple hearings on reforming the statutory 
license for reproducing and distributing musical works under section 115.  See Section 115 Reform Act 
(SIRA) of 2006:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 33. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (2001) [hereinafter SECTION 104 
REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html. 
 34. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006) [hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS 
REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. 
 35. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION AND LOCALISM ACT, § 302 
REPORT (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 302 REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ 
section302-report.pdf; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT (2008), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ 
section109-final-report.pdf; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT § 110 REPORT (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/satellite-
report.pdf. 
 36. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF GAP GRANTS UNDER THE TERMINATION PROVISIONS 
OF TITLE 17 (2010), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/gap-grant-analysis.pdf. 
 37. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION:  A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (2011) [hereinafter MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf. 
 38. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf. 
 39. See Resale Royalty Right, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,175 (Sept. 19, 2012). 
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 A pending study on solutions for enforcement of small copyright claims.40 
Finally, Congress has introduced a number of bills that have not moved much 
over the years, on a variety of issues that it may or may not wish to consider 
further.  For example, in the past ten years, bills have been introduced that would 
extend copyright-like protection to fashion designs,41 exempt churches from 
infringement liability for showing football games,42 add a fair use exemption to 
section 1201,43 require a nominal fee to retain copyright protection after fifty 
years,44 and require new standards for Copyright Royalty Judges with regard to 
webcasting.45  A general revision effort would offer everyone the opportunity to 
step back and consider issues both large and small, as well as the relationship of 
these issues to the larger statute and the importance or unimportance of 
international developments. 
C.  THE COURTS 
It should come as no surprise that courts also are reflecting the wear and tear of 
the statute.  In some areas, courts have picked up where Congress left off.  Thus in 
the context of peer-to-peer networks, courts have fashioned the concept of 
inducement as part of the secondary liability analysis, and in the context of the 
DMCA, courts have interpreted section 512’s knowledge standards.46  In other 
areas, courts appear to be struggling with existing statutory language.  Consider the 
Second Circuit’s 2008 Cablevision holding on public performances, which 
indicates that a performance is not made “to the public” unless more than one 
person is capable of receiving a particular transmission (i.e., a transmission made 
using a unique copy of a given work).47  As the Solicitor General’s Office noted, 
“[s]uch a construction could threaten to undermine copyright protection in 
circumstances far beyond those presented.”48  Moreover, this comes at the very 
time that copyrighted works are increasingly disseminated via streaming, thus 
making the public performance right more important than ever. 
In some cases, courts have expressed their opinions about the statute directly in 
their decisions.  For example, in Authors Guild v. Google Inc., the Southern District 
of New York stated that “[t]he questions of who should be entrusted with 
guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are 
matters more appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among 
 
 40. See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,758 (Oct. 27, 2011). 
 41. H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 42. S. 2591, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 43. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 44. H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 45. H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 3609, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 46. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30–35 (2d Cir. 2012); Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122661, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
 47. Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 48. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., No. 08-448 (U.S. 2009). 
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private, self-interested parties.”49  In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. 
Tenenbaum, the First Circuit observed that Congress might wish to examine the 
application of the Copyright Act regarding statutory damages.50  In Flava Works, 
Inc. v. Gunter, a case involving streaming video, the Seventh Circuit noted the 
difficulty of determining when a public performance begins and stated that 
“[l]egislative clarification of the public-performance provision of the Copyright Act 
would therefore be most welcome.”51  And in Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court 
observed that Congress may need to consider legislative solutions to offset “[o]ur 
unstinting adherence to Berne.”52 
D.  READABILITY 
Finally, we need a clearer copyright act for a rather simple reason:  more and 
more people are affected by it.  Because the dissemination of content is so 
pervasive in the twenty-first century, copyright issues are necessarily pervasive as 
well—from fair use in education to statutory licenses for new businesses, to the 
parameters of liability and enforcement online and in the home.  Regulations and 
education could certainly help in some instances.  However, if one needs an army 
of lawyers to understand the basic precepts of the law, then it is time for a new law. 
II.  REVISION ISSUES 
The next great copyright act must be forward thinking but flexible, and, no 
matter what, it must serve the public interest.  Thus, it must confirm and rationalize 
certain fundamental aspects of the law, including the ability of authors and their 
licensees to control and exploit their creative works, whether content is distributed 
on the street or streamed from the cloud.  And it must provide sufficient clarity to 
those who seek to use protected works. 
 
 49. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 50. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S.Ct. 2431 (2012). 
 51. 689 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 52. Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (noting the long copyright term as a factor in 
current problems like orphan works). 
Courts offered further observations along these lines in the weeks following my delivery of this 
lecture.  See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2371, at *57 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013) 
(“Whether copyright owners should, or should not, have more than ordinary commercial power to divide 
international markets is a matter for Congress to decide.  We do no more here than try to determine what 
decision Congress has taken.”); WNET, Thirteen, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 2013 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 6578, at *50 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 2013) (noting that “unanticipated technological developments 
have created tension between Congress’ view that retranmissions of network programs by cable 
television systems should be deemed public performances and its intent that some transmissions be 
classified as private”); Capitol Records, LLC v. Redigi, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48043, at *35–36 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2013) (concluding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital copies, 
acknowledging that “this limitation clearly presents obstacles to [the] resale [of digital music files] that 
are different from, and perhaps even more onerous than, those involved in the resale of CDs and 
cassettes,” and stating that “[i]t is left to Congress, and not this Court, to deem [these physical 
limitations] outmoded”). 
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This is not to say that the control of copyright owners should be absolute (it 
should not be), but it does need to be meaningful.  After all, people around the 
world increasingly are accessing content on mobile devices, and fewer and fewer of 
them will need or desire the physical copies that were so central to the nineteenth 
and twentieth century copyright laws.53  Thus, Congress has a central equation to 
consider today:  what does and does not belong under a copyright owner’s control? 
In considering the universe of issues that may warrant review at this time, Congress 
also will want to consider the exceptions and limitations, enforcement tools, 
licensing schemes and registration system it wants for the twenty-first century.  
Some of these issues are addressed below. 
A.  MAJOR ISSUES 
1.  Exclusive Rights 
Among the specific issues at play are the application of longstanding but 
evolving exclusive rights, such as reproduction and distribution, as well as the 
application and evolution of the public performance right on the Internet (for 
example, to authorize the streaming of music, movies, television shows or sporting 
events).54 
Starting with the latter, the Copyright Office has long supported a more 
complete right of public performance for sound recordings, commensurate with the 
rights afforded to other classes of works under U.S. law and provided for in 
virtually all industrialized countries around the globe.55  As noted above, this is an 
issue on which Congress has spent many years deliberating.  Owners of sound 
recordings are disadvantaged under current law in that they enjoy an exclusive right 
of reproduction and distribution but not public performance.56  Moreover, because 
 
 53. See, e.g., ITU Releases Latest Global Technology Development Figures, INT’L TELECOMMS. 
UNION (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2013/05.aspx (“ICT Facts and 
Figures report predicts that there will soon be as many mobile-cellular subscriptions as people inhabiting 
the planet, with the figure set to nudge past the seven billion mark early in 2014.  More than half of all 
mobile subscriptions are now in Asia, which remains the powerhouse of market growth, and by the end 
of 2013 overall mobile penetration rates will have reached 96% globally, 128% in the developed world, 
and 89% in developing countries.”).  
 54. The 1976 Act’s exclusive rights are set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).  Also at play may be 
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities or some reasonable definition thereof, 
and the distinction between published and unpublished works, which continues to affect the operation of 
core provisions. 
 55. “Many countries of the world, and virtually all industrialized countries, recognize 
performance rights for sound recordings, including performances made by means of broadcast 
transmissions. . . .  These countries recognize the incredible value of a recording artist’s interpretation of 
a musical composition or other artistic work.”  Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation:  Updating the 
Performance Right and Platform Parity for the 21st Century:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement 
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
regstat073107.html. 
 56. In 1995, a limited right to perform a sound recording publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission was added at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) in order for the United States to comply with Article 15 of 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, see Pub. L. No. 102-155, § 2, 109 Stat. 336, 336 
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of the disparity in royalty obligations, there is an increasingly stark economic 
disadvantage for businesses that offer sound recordings over the Internet.  Congress 
has done quite a lot of thinking on this already.  How to craft a final resolution for 
all concerned should be a priority for the next great copyright act. 
The scope of the distribution right also is a central theme today, as courts work 
through whether and how it may be implicated and enforced in relation to use of 
works over the Internet.57  One key issue in the courts is the degree to which a 
claimed violation of the exclusive right to authorize distribution of a work requires 
a showing of actual dissemination of a work or whether the act of making the work 
available online is sufficient.58 
2.  Incidental Copies 
The reproduction right could also use a makeover, but for a different reason.  
The reproduction right has been a valuable tool in enforcement proceedings, 
helping to ameliorate the confusion or inadequacies of other provisions, particularly 
in the context of peer-to-peer file sharing or illegal streaming.59  However, new 
technologies have made it increasingly apparent that not all reproductions are equal 
in the digital age.  Some copies are merely incidental to an intended primary use of 
a work, including where primary uses are licensed, and these incidental copies 
should not necessarily be treated as infringing. 
The 1976 Act recognized and addressed the incidental nature of certain copies 
by providing fact-specific exceptions and limitations in section 112 (for making 
 
(1995), but no comparable right exists with respect to the public performances of sound recordings over 
the air by traditional broadcasters.  
 57. See David O. Carson, Making the Making Available Right Available:  22nd Annual Horace S. 
Manges Lecture, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135, 150 (2010); Robert Kasunic, Making Circumstantial 
Proof of Distribution Available, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1145 (2008); Peter 
Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark:  Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 6 (2011). 
 58. See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stopping 
short of endorsing a full “making available” right, but accepting that an offer to distribute a work for the 
purpose of its further distribution or public performance constitutes an infringement of the distribution 
right); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, 2008 WL 2316551, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008) (holding 
that making copyrighted works available for download via a peer-to-peer network contemplates “further 
distribution,” which is a violation of the distribution right); Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, 2007 WL 
576284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (finding that infringement of the distribution right can be based 
on actual distribution or by an offer to distribute, i.e., proof that the work was “made available” by the 
defendant); Universal City Studios Prods. LLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D. Me. 2006) 
(holding that defendants violated plaintiff’s exclusive right to distribute copyrighted works “by using 
KaZaA to make copies of the Motion Pictures available to thousands of people over the internet”); 
Interscope Records v. Duty, 2006 WL 988086, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) (holding that the “mere 
presence of copyrighted [works] in [defendant’s] share file may constitute copyright infringement”).  
But see Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008) (concluding that 
“[m]erely making an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work available to the public does not violate a 
copyright holder’s exclusive right of distribution.”); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 
153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008) (concluding that “defendants cannot be liable for violating the plaintiffs’ 
distribution right unless a ‘distribution’ actually occurred”).  
 59. See Carson, supra note 57, at 150. 
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ephemeral recordings of certain works in order to facilitate broadcast 
transmissions) and section 117 (for making a copy of a computer program—such as 
a “read-only” copy—that is essential for the utilization of that work).  The DMCA 
did the same in section 512 (for the intermediate and temporary storage of 
copyrighted material in the course of transitory digital network communications 
and system caching) and in section 117 (for making an incidental copy of a 
computer program when maintaining or repairing a machine that contains an 
authorized copy of that program).60 
In 2001, the Copyright Office examined the issue in a report known as the 
Section 104 Report.  There, the Office noted the uncertainty around temporary 
copies of works in the context of digital commerce, and the fact that “[c]ourts have 
not attempted to formulate a general rule defining how long a reproduction must 
endure to be ‘fixed,’ deciding instead on a case by case basis whether the particular 
reproduction at issue sufficed.”61  The Section 104 Report recommended the 
enactment of several additional exemptions for the creation of copies that are 
incidental to licensed use.62 
Because incidental or transient copies are made by consumers on a daily basis 
and in a variety of otherwise lawful activities involving consumer electronics and 
computer programs, there may be room for yet further discussion of this issue.63  In 
any event, as the confusion over incidental copies has persisted, this is an area 
where Congress could provide a voice of reason. 
3.  Enforcement 
A twenty-first century copyright act requires twenty-first century enforcement 
strategies.  These must respect the technical integrity and expressive capabilities of 
the Internet as well as the rule of law.  It is possible and necessary to combine 
safeguards for free expression, guarantees of due process, and respect for 
intellectual property in the copyright law.  As the Supreme Court recognized, “the 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”64 
In short, the next great copyright act presents an opportunity.  All members of 
the online ecosystem should have a role, including payment processors, advertising 
networks, search engines, Internet service providers and copyright owners.  These 
strategies can be a mix of legislative solutions and complementary voluntary 
initiatives,65 but where gaps in the law exist, Congress should not be absent.66 
 
 60. In 1998, the DMCA amended section 117 by inserting headings for subsections (a) and (b) 
and by adding subsections (c) and (d).  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 302, 
112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998). 
 61. SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 33, at 111. 
 62. See id. at 142–48.  
 63. See generally DENA CHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT REFORM ACT:  PROVIDING AN INCIDENTAL 
COPIES EXEMPTION FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS AND END-USERS (2011), available at 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/craincidentalcopies.pdf. 
 64. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 65. For example, a number of rights holders and service providers recently announced a voluntary 
“Copyright Alert System” that will help educate the public and address online infringing occurring on 
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One critical issue is the ability of law enforcement to prosecute the rising tide of 
illegal streaming in the criminal context.67  Streaming implicates the copyright 
owner’s exclusive right of public performance:  it is a major means by which 
copyright owners license their rights in sporting events, television programs, 
movies and music to customers, who in turn access the content on their televisions, 
smart phones, tablets or video consoles.68  Under current law there is a disparity 
that may have once been of little consequence but is today a major problem:  
prosecutors may pursue felony charges in the case of illegal reproductions or 
distributions, but are limited to misdemeanor charges when the work is streamed, 
even where such conduct is large scale, willful and undertaken for a profit 
motive.69  As a practical matter, prosecutors have little incentive to file charges at 
all, or they have reason to pursue only those cases where the rights of reproduction 
and distribution are also at issue.  This lack of parity neither reflects nor serves the 
digital marketplace.70 
Mechanisms for small copyright claims are also an active topic and the focus of 
a Copyright Office study.71  Under current law, copyright lawsuits are reserved to 
 
certain networks.  See generally The Copyright Alert System, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 66. For example, Congress has looked at the sufficiency of enforcement mechanisms in cases 
where bad faith actors are offering infringing content to U.S. consumers from websites controlled 
outside of the United States, a situation where the proposed solutions have generated a great deal of 
controversy and which are, at the very least,  as complex as the problem itself.  See generally Promoting 
Investment and Protecting Commerce Online:  Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part 1:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-153_65186.pdf; 
Targeting Websites Dedicated to Stealing American Intellectual Property:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg67443/pdf/CHRG-112shrg67443.pdf. 
 67. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 11 (2011) (noting the 
problem of illegal streaming and linking sites); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PIRACY OF 
DIGITAL CONTENT, CASE STUDY:  THE SPORTS OWNERS SECTOR 90 (2009), available at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/science-and-technology/piracy-of-digital-
content_9789264065437-en (discussing streaming of sporting events).  
 68. According to one recent study, video streaming traffic alone now accounts for more than one 
quarter of all Internet traffic and is among the fastest growing areas of the Internet.  See ENVISIONAL, 
TECHNICAL REPORT:  AN ESTIMATE OF INFRINGING USE OF THE INTERNET 3, 19 (2011), available at 
http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-Jan2011.pdf. 
 69. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (2008). 
 70. See Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online:  The ART Act, The NET Act and 
Illegal Streaming:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011); see also WHITE HOUSE, 
ADMINISTRATION’S WHITE PAPER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
ip_white_paper.pdf (“To ensure that Federal copyright law keeps pace with infringers, and to ensure that 
DOJ and U.S. law enforcement agencies are able to effectively combat infringement involving new 
technology, the Administration recommends that Congress clarify that infringement by streaming, or by 
means of other similar new technology, is a felony in appropriate circumstances.”). 
 71. See Remedies for Copyright Small Claims, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http:// 
www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).  Congress has asked the Copyright 
Office to study the challenges of the current system for resolving small copyright claim disputes, as well 
as possible alternative systems, and to report back by the end of September 2013. 
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the federal courts.  While this ensures consistency in the treatment of federal 
subject matter, it can also be quite costly and time consuming, effectively 
preventing the enforcement of many infringement claims of authors and others who 
do not have or cannot justify expending the resources.  The question is whether 
Congress should create a streamlined adjudicative process to assist copyright 
owners with claims of small economic value.72 
This brings me to statutory damages.  Some would eliminate the precondition in 
section 412 of the Copyright Act that limits the availability of statutory damages to 
those who register with the Copyright Office in a timely manner.73  They believe 
that it places an undue burden on the people who need statutory damages the most 
but are least likely to be aware of the condition, namely authors.  Cost is also an 
issue, particularly for prolific creators like photographers, who may be unable to 
register each and every work under a separate application and have for years 
enjoyed a reduced rate through a group registration option.  This gives 
photographers the ability to claim statutory damages, but often without providing 
effective public disclosure of what the group registration covers.  Section 412 also 
acts as a filter, reducing the number of claims from copyright owners and the level 
of exposure for infringers.  Unfortunately, it does this for bad faith actors and good 
faith actors alike. 
Section 412 was designed as a precaution and an incentive in 1976—a time 
when the law was moving to automatic protection and many were worried about 
the ramifications for authors, the public record and the Library of Congress’ 
collection.  Section 412 thus creates a bargain:  the copyright owner preserves his 
ability to elect statutory damages in exchange for registering, thereby ensuring a 
more complete public record of copyright information and a better collection for 
the Library of Congress. 
Whether and how section 412 has achieved these goals may be ripe for review 
again.74  On the one hand, the availability of statutory damages is essential for 
some copyright owners irrespective of registration, namely for authors.  On the 
other hand, the public database is important, and the Library’s collection is critical.  
However, if statutory damages are to remain tethered to registration, then the public 
record will need to be much more useful to prospective licensees than it is now.  To 
 
 72. The Copyright Office is not the only government agency investigating the issue of smaller-
value intellectual property claims.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is conducting a review of 
small patent claims.  See Request for Comments on Patent Small Claims Proceedings in the United 
States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec. 18, 2012).  The issue is also not limited to the United States; the 
United Kingdom has instituted a special track for smaller-value intellectual property claims.  See New 
Small Claims Track for Businesses with IP Disputes, INTELL. PROP. OFFICE, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ 
about/press/press-release/press-release-2012/press-release-20121001.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).   
 73. Section 412 provides that, with certain exceptions, statutory damages and awards of 
attorney’s fees are not available to the copyright owner when:  (1) infringement of copyright in an 
unpublished work commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2) infringement of 
copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, 
unless such registration was made within three months after the first publication of the work.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 412 (2008).  
 74. See LIBRARY OF CONG., ADVISORY COMM. ON REGISTRATION & DEPOSIT, REPORT OF THE 
CO-CHAIRS, ROBERT WEDGEWORTH AND BARBARA RINGER 6 (1993) [hereinafter ACCORD REPORT]. 
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this end, one professor has suggested that the recordation function in the law could 
be improved by requiring exclusive licensees to record their licenses promptly or 
risk their rights defaulting back to the grantor.75 
More globally, arguments abound on the subject of statutory damages, 
suggesting that they are too high, too low, too easy or too hard to pursue.  Statutory 
damages have long been an important part of copyright law to ensure that copyright 
owners are compensated for infringement, at least where actual damages are 
unworkable.  The Copyright Act of 1790 included a provision awarding the 
copyright owner fifty cents for every sheet of an unauthorized copy that was 
printed, published, imported or exposed to sale.76  Statutory damages should remain 
squarely in the next great copyright act irrespective of section 412.  However, there 
may be plenty to do on the edges, including providing guidance to the courts (e.g., 
in considering whether exponential awards against individuals for the infringement 
of large numbers of works should bear a relationship to the actual harm or profit 
involved), and finding new ways to improve the public record of copyright 
ownership. 
4.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
A general review of copyright issues in the twenty-first century would be 
incomplete without a review of the DMCA.  On the one hand, it is our best model 
of future-leaning legislation.  On the other hand, fifteen years have passed, and the 
world—including most notably the Internet—has evolved.  Thus, if only for the 
exercise of establishing how the DMCA is working, including how affected parties 
have implemented its provisions and courts across the country have applied it, 
Congress should take stock of the last decade and a half. 
The section 512 safe harbors in particular have generated more than their fair 
share of litigation on issues such as eligibility for the safe harbor, inducement and 
monitoring.77  Some of these issues were imaginable at the time at the time of their 
enactment, and others were not.  There are other concerns that go more generally to 
the question of whether the burdens of notice and takedown are fairly shared 
between copyright owners and intermediaries. 
 
 75. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Copyright Formalities:  A Love/Hate 
Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 345–46 (2010); see also Council Directive 2006/116, 2006 
O.J. (L 372) 1 (EC) (offering a longer term of protection where the author is identified). 
 76. See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
 77. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, No. 09-55902, at 33 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 14, 2013) (concluding that “merely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music 
videos, with the general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is 
insufficient” to prove that a website had actual knowledge of infringing activity); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing actual knowledge—or subjective awareness 
of specific infringing acts—from “red flag” knowledge, which the court described as an objective 
standard turning on whether the service provider was aware of facts from which a reasonable person 
would infer the existence of specific infringing acts); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 122661 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (concluding that a file-sharing service that actively 
induced infringement was ineligible for the safe harbors because the safe harbors are intended to protect 
passive good faith conduct). 
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The DMCA also created legal protections for the technological protection 
measures used by copyright owners, as well as a triennial rulemaking process by 
which proponents could make the case for temporary exemptions to such measures 
to allow circumvention in cases where it is necessary to permit noninfringing 
activity.78  The Copyright Office has conducted five rulemakings since 1998.79  
Each rulemaking is conducted de novo and includes an evidentiary record 
developed during the proceedings.  Congress intended the rulemaking to provide “a 
fail-safe mechanism” for noninfringing uses, including fair uses.80  Like much of 
Title 17, the mechanisms of the rulemaking may benefit from congressional review 
at this time, but it generally has served the nation well. 
During the last proceeding, concluded in 2012, the Copyright Office 
recommended, and the Librarian granted, six exemptions that ran the gamut of 
technological issues.  These included exemptions for persons with print disabilities 
using assistive technologies like screen readers, as well as exemptions for teachers 
and documentary filmmakers accessing protected motion pictures in the course of 
their work.81 
When the Copyright Office has not recommended exemptions, it has been 
because the balancing of the factors set forth in section 1201 did not favor doing 
so—that is, because the legal or evidentiary standards (or both) had not been met.  
In the most recent rulemaking, the Office recommended against granting an 
exemption to permit “jailbreaking” of videogame consoles because the proponents 
did not establish that there were adverse effects stemming from the prohibition—
namely because the record revealed myriad alternatives to achieve the proponents’ 
intended purpose which did not require circumvention.  In the context of unlocking 
cell phones, the Copyright Office was again asked to consider the exemption that it 
had crafted in two of the previous four rulemakings.  It concluded that the 
exemption should continue for “legacy” phones, i.e. phones already purchased by 
consumers on or before January 26, 2013, but was unable to extend the 
recommendation to new phones in light of the evidentiary record, which 
demonstrated that carriers were offering unlocked cell phones in the marketplace, 
and that consumers could therefore choose to purchase them over the next three 
 
 78. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 79. The Conference Report on the DMCA states: 
[T]he determination will be made in a rulemaking proceeding on the record.  It is the intention of 
the conferees that, as is typical with other rulemaking under title 17, and in recognition of the 
expertise of the Copyright Office, the Register of Copyrights will conduct the rulemaking, 
including providing notice of the rulemaking, seeking comments from the public, consulting with 
the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce 
and any other agencies that are deemed appropriate, and recommending final regulations in the 
report to the Librarian.  
H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 64 (1998); see also Section 1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against 
Circumvention of Technological Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998). 
 81. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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years.82  While the rulemaking process is necessarily narrow, it sits at a dynamic 
intersection of technology, emerging markets, the protection of intellectual 
property, fair use and other nonfringing activities.  It therefore often serves as a 
barometer for policy concerns and policy action beyond the confines of the 
statute.83 
5.  Digital First Sale 
The doctrine of first sale has been a part of the copyright law for more than one 
hundred years, but it could benefit from congressional attention at this time, at least 
with respect to digital copies but also possibly with respect to the importation and 
exportation of physical copies in certain circumstances.  First sale is rooted in the 
common law rule against restraints on the alienation of tangible property and is 
codified in section 109 of the 1976 Act.  It provides that “the owner of a particular 
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by 
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”84 
As for its role in the digital realm, the Copyright Office conducted an early 
study for Congress in 2001.85  In part, the Office addressed the question of whether 
the first sale doctrine should be modified to allow users to transmit digital copies of 
creative works without the consent of copyright owners.  At that time, the Office 
recommended against doing so, noting that transmission of works interfered with 
the copyright owners’ control, but acknowledged that the issues may require further 
 
 82. See U.S. Copyright Office, Section 1201 Rulemaking:  Fifth Triennial Proceeding to 
Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention, Recommendation of the Register of 
Copyrights, at 45–47, 79 (Oct. 2012) [hereinafter Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights]. 
 83. See, e.g., David R. Edelman, It’s Time to Legalize Cell Phone Unlocking, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/its-time-legalize-cell-phone-unlocking (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013) (Official White House response to a petition to “Make Unlocking Cell Phones Illegal”); Statement 
from the Library of Congress Regarding White House Statement Today in Response to a Petition on 
Section 1201 Rulemaking, LIBRARY OF CONG., (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2013/13-
041.html.  As of this writing, several bills are pending.  From time to time, the Copyright Office has also 
noted other issues of public policy in the context of the rulemaking analysis, including most recently the 
need to update provisions for persons who are blind or have other print disabilities.  See, e.g., 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 24; see also 159 CONG. REC. S1,594 
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy on the introduction of the Unlocking Consumer 
Choice and Wireless Competition Act), 159 Cong Rec S1594, at *S1,594 (“Unfortunately, in its most 
recent proceeding, there was not a sufficient record for the Library to continue the cell phone exemption, 
despite the strong merits of the rule.  Our legislation restores the important exemption that had been in 
effect in previous years.  Although Congress has stepped in in this instance to restore an important 
policy objective, I urge parties in future rulemakings to provide a more full record so that the rulemaking 
process can proceed as it was designed.”); House Judiciary Members Introduce Legislation to Restore 
Consumers’ Ability to Unlock Cell Phones, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013/03142013.html (“‘The quality 
of the DMCA process depends upon the quality of the record.  Future participants in the process should 
build an adequate record upon which an exemption may be based,’ Subcommittee Ranking Member 
Watt said.”). 
 84. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1976).  
 85. See SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 33. 
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consideration at some point in the future.86  The report explained: 
In order to recommend a change in the law, there should be a demonstrated need for 
the change that outweighs the negative aspects of the proposal.  The Copyright Office 
does not believe that this is the case with the proposal to expand the scope of section 
109 to include digital transmissions.  The time may come when Congress may wish to 
address these concerns should they materialize.87 
More than a decade later, the doctrine of first sale may be difficult to rationalize 
in the digital context, but Congress nonetheless could choose to review it, much as 
it considered the issues of renewal registration and termination in 1976.88  On the 
one hand, Congress may believe that in a digital marketplace, the copyright owner 
should control all copies of his work, particularly because digital copies are perfect 
copies (not dog-eared copies of lesser value) or because in online commerce the 
migration from the sale of copies to the proffering of licenses has negated the issue.  
On the other hand, Congress may find that the general principle of first sale has 
ongoing merit in the digital age and can be adequately policed through 
technology—for example, through measures that would prevent or destroy 
duplicative copies.  Or, more simply, Congress may not want a copyright law 
where everything is licensed and nothing is owned. 
6.  Exceptions and Limitations 
Constructing the next great copyright act will require many discussions about 
the place given to exceptions and limitations.
89
  These include:  updating baseline 
standards for libraries and archives, crafting a digital age Chafee Amendment (for 
print disabilities), addressing the ecosystem of higher education institutions and 
markets, and possibly considering clarity in personal use activities.  While fair use 
can also be helpful to users of copyrighted works in appropriately tailored 
circumstances, it requires an intensive application of the facts at hand and is 
therefore ill-suited as a vehicle for bright line rules or more systematic activities of 
users.  Nonetheless, exceptions and the fair use provisions should be viewed as 
complements within the law.90 
The Copyright Office has been focused on the section 108 library exceptions for 
 
 86. See id. at 73. 
 87. Id. at xx. 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 89.  Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention first outlined what is known as the “three step test,” and 
applies that test to the right of reproduction.  The WTO TRIPS Agreement, in Article 13, expanded the 
three step test to apply to all rights contained in the TRIPS Agreement, and states:  “Members shall 
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.”  Furthermore, the two WIPO “Internet treaties,” the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, reiterated the three step test for the exclusive rights provided in 
those treaties (WCT Article 10 and WPPT Article 16). 
 90. Section 108(f)(4) includes an express savings clause specifically excepting fair use from the 
discussion of § 108 limitations.  17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2006) (“Nothing in this section . . . in any way 
affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107.”).  
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several years.  More broadly, its work on orphan works has generated several 
hearings in past sessions of Congress and ongoing interest in the intellectual 
property community.91  These issues are the subject of ongoing public inquiries, 
symposia and recommendations.  Likewise, the question of special provisions for 
persons who are blind or have other print disabilities is ripe for review, having been 
front and center over the past few years, including in Geneva, in the courts, in the 
section 1201 rulemaking, and in a government study.92 
Higher education activities could also benefit from congressional direction.  As 
noted previously, Congress deferred the option of a general education exception in 
1976.  However, it did enact a special exception for distance education in 2002,93 
following a study from the Copyright Office.94  Unfortunately, the complexity of 
the provision, as enacted, has largely undermined its usefulness in the eyes of many 
educators.  Congressional review of higher education—which is so dynamic—
would be beneficial, especially because the legal framework must ultimately 
support and encourage a variety of copyright objectives.  These include:  markets 
that produce quality educational materials, affordable licensing schemes, open 
source materials, the reasonable application of fair use, library exceptions, 
academic freedom—including the freedom of faculty to disclaim copyright in their 
own works—and formats that are accessible to persons with print disabilities. 
7.  Licensing 
Congress is aware that the development of newer, more efficient licensing 
models is essential to the digital marketplace and the many submarkets that 
comprise it.  Some of this does not require legislation and should merely be 
encouraged, i.e. by reviewing the growth of direct licensing, microlicensing, 
voluntary collective licensing and private and public registries.95  In other 
 
 91. See Letter from David J. Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., to Maria 
A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights (Jan. 2013) (expressing his support for the “work that the U.S. 
Copyright Office is doing to examine the problem of orphan works” and noting that “it is in the 
leadership interests of the United States to explore solutions”), reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
ORPHAN WORKS ANALYSIS, Part II (forthcoming 2013).   
 92. See Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 16; Advisory Comm’n 
on Accessible Instructional Materials, Report of the Advisory Commission on Accessible Instructional 
Materials in Postsecondary Education for Students with Disabilities (Dec. 2011), available at 
www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/aim/meeting/aim-report.doc; WIPO, Draft Text of an International 
Instrument/Treaty on Limitations and Exceptions for Visually Impaired Persons/Persons with Print 
Disabilities, SCCR/25/2 REV. (2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/ 
sccr_25/sccr_25_2_rev.doc (text of draft instrument currently in negotiation at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization). 
 93. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(2). 
 94. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DISTANCE EDUCATION (1999), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/de_rprt.pdf. 
 95. In 2011, the Copyright Office, at the direction of Congress, explored in public hearings 
whether, after more than thirty-five years of experience with statutory licenses facilitating the 
retransmission of broadcast signals by cable and satellite providers, the time had come to eliminate the 
licenses in favor of one or more marketplace licensing mechanisms.  The Office concluded that, while 
business models based on sublicensing, collective licensing and/or direct licensing may be relatively 
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instances, Congress may need to consider legislating new forms of licensing 
regimes as appropriate, e.g. by updating, or in some cases repealing, compulsory 
licenses, or perhaps by enacting extended collective licensing models.96 
Music reform is a particularly important licensing topic.  The mechanical license 
for musical works—over a century old and currently embodied in section 115 of 
the Act—was established by Congress out of a concern that a single entity might 
monopolize the piano roll market by buying up exclusive rights.  Over time, this 
compulsory license—with its government-established rate—has become deeply 
embedded in the music industry.  In the deliberations leading to the adoption of the 
1976 Act, then-Register Kaminstein suggested that monopoly was no longer much 
of a concern and the license should perhaps be repealed.97  But music publishers 
did not ultimately pursue that possibility, opting instead for an adjustment to the 
two-cent rate to two and three-quarters, and the license remains in effect today. 
Although amended in 1995 to clarify that it covers digital phonorecord 
deliveries as well as physical formats, the basic song-by-song licensing mechanism 
of the mechanical license has remained unchanged for over one hundred years.  But 
because digital service providers have varying business models, ranging from on-
demand streaming services to permanent downloads to music bundled with other 
products, the rates adopted under section 115 have become increasingly complex.  
In recent years, some music publishers—especially larger ones—are choosing to 
license their reproduction and distribution rights, and even their public performance 
rights, directly to digital services instead of through third-party administrators such 
as The Harry Fox Agency, ASCAP, BMI or SESAC.  Meanwhile, music services 
tell us that it is essential to have the full repertoire of musical works available to be 
a viable player in the digital marketplace.98 
In 2006, Congress considered legislation, the Section 115 Reform Act (or 
“SIRA”), that would have changed the section 115 licensing structure to a blanket-
style system for digital uses, but it was not enacted.  It may be time for Congress to 
take another look. 
Congress is already taking another look at section 114, the statutory licensing 
provisions for webcasters, satellite radio and others seeking to engage in the digital 
 
undeveloped in this context, they are feasible alternatives to secure the public performance rights 
necessary to retransmit copyrighted content in most instances.  See SECTION 302 REPORT, supra note 35. 
 96. Extended collective licensing would require Congress to enact a framework by which works 
are made available for certain purposes without the need for case by case or prior permission, but in 
which representatives of the various stakeholders negotiate fees, mechanisms for opting out and other 
key terms.  For more information, see MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 37. 
 97. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 32–36 (1961), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ 
annual/archive/ar-1961.pdf.  
 98. Even this abbreviated overview points to some significant questions about the section 115 
license in the digital age.  The questions span a wide range of issues, from the workability of a song-by-
song licensing framework to the desirability of one-stop licensing options for both reproduction and 
public performance, among many others.  See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
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performance of sound recordings.99  As the November 2012 hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet 
highlighted, the rate setting concerns of the webcasting community cannot be 
viewed in isolation; they are tied to the overall statutory licensing structure and 
even the scope of exclusive rights afforded for sound recordings under the 
Copyright Act. 
To make a long story short, Congress could make a real difference regarding 
gridlock in the music marketplace.  Considering the issues comprehensively may 
be the most productive course of action. 
8.  Deposits for the Library of Congress 
The Library of Congress receives books, films, music and other copyright 
deposits through two separate provisions of the Copyright Act:  (1) section 408 
deposits, which are the works copyright owners submit to the Copyright Office for 
purposes of copyright registration; and (2) section 407 deposits, which are those 
that the copyright owners of published works are required to submit for the national 
collection within three months of publication and which the Copyright Office has 
legal authority to demand in instances of noncompliance.100  The provisions 
complement each other, and both should remain in some form in the next great 
copyright act.  They may, however, require some fresh thinking, particularly as to 
the evolving state of the Library’s collection needs. 
With respect to the registration system, the Library enjoys a unique place in the 
copyright law, as it has been both the custodian and a key beneficiary of the system 
since 1870.101  However, its ability to evolve in the twenty-first century is directly 
tied to its ability to collect and preserve a variety of content, including digital 
content.  In the past, in some instances, the Copyright Office was able to align the 
format requirements for copyright deposits with the specific needs of the Library.  
For example, under the discretionary authority granted to the Register of 
Copyrights, the Office created special group options for newspapers in 1992, 
making it easier for newspapers to register but also facilitating the formats the 
Library desired for preservation (in this example, microfilm) and would otherwise 
have had to purchase.102 
 
 99. See Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 (“IRFA”), H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).  
Proponents of IRFA argue that Internet radio is disadvantaged under the current Copyright Royalty 
Board system and urge that what they perceive as the more flexible factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 
801(b) for satellite radio and other digital users be substituted for the “willing buyer/willing seller” 
standard currently applicable to webcasters.  The legislation has drawn substantial opposition, including 
from the artist community, which has emphasized the lack of a terrestrial performance right for radio.  
Both sides, in other words, are arguing for parity in the royalty rate structure across different platforms.   
 100. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408 (2012). 
 101. Congress transferred responsibility for registration to the Library in 1870, and in doing so 
turned copyright deposits into a national collection.  The Copyright Office was created within the 
Library in 1897, leading to the appointment of Thorvald Solberg as Register. 
 102. Activities like this largely are carried out by the Register, in accordance with the statute.  The 
exception is instances where regulations are finally promulgated, in which case the Librarian, as head of 
the agency for purposes of the Constitution and as reflected in the statutory framework, signs the final 
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As a matter of law, copyright registration of course predates the Library and has 
other longstanding functions.  Registration is prima facie evidence of 
copyrightability and copyright ownership, a condition of the availability of 
statutory damages, and a catalyst for the public record of copyright information.  
The authoritative determination of copyrightability provides guidance to the courts 
in a number of areas, including questions related to the scope of protection and any 
limitations or presumptions reflected in the certificate.  Registration certificates are 
frequently required by businesses to conclude intellectual property transactions, 
secure insurance policies, and settle matters of litigation, not only within the United 
States but also in deal making and litigation around the globe.  It therefore must be 
evaluated broadly, against the objectives of the greater copyright law.103 
In fact, as the Library seeks to acquire and preserve websites, electronic serials 
and the other kinds of twenty-first century authorship, registration may not be 
enough of a tool.  Instead, the mandatory deposit provisions may need to play a 
greater role generally, and may need granular adjustments to make them viable in 
the digital environment.  For example, many digital works may not be “published” 
within the meaning of the “best edition” requirements of current law, placing them 
outside the parameters of section 407.  It is also true that the formats required by 
the Library may not be the formats that actually are published by the copyright 
owner, and it is further true that the Library’s collection of digital deposits may 
require clearer rules regarding the security of files and the conditions for making 
them available.  In any event, the next great copyright act should ensure that the 
mandatory deposit provisions are flexible enough to support the needs of the 
national collection. 
B.  THINKING A LITTLE MORE BOLDLY 
As with previous revisions, Congress may need to apply fresh eyes to the next 
great copyright act to ensure that the copyright law remains functional, credible and 
relevant for the future.  This does not require it to abandon core principles of the 
copyright system, but it may require some recalibrations as appropriate and 
workable in the greater legal framework. 
1.  Offsetting Copyright Term 
Copyright term is a global issue and any discussion of U.S. term therefore 
should acknowledge international norms.  Nonetheless, the current term—in most 
circumstances, the life of the author plus seventy years—is long, and the length has 
consequences.104  One has to assume that Eldred v. Ashcroft is the last word as to 
 
rule.  See 17 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).  
 103. See ACCORD REPORT, supra note 74 (noting that, while important, “[l]ibrary acquisitions 
policy should not drive copyright registration policy”).   
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998) (setting forth general term, including a term for works made for hire 
and pseudonymous and anonymous works of ninety-five years from the year of its first publication, or a 
term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first).  An informal count shows that 
approximately eighty countries (and probably more) have adopted life plus seventy years as the standard 
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whether life-plus-seventy is a constitutionally permissible term.105  However, from 
a policy perspective, that is no longer the relevant question.  The question now is 
how to make the long term more functional. 
The Copyright Office is interested in pragmatic solutions that are appropriate 
and meaningful for the twenty-first century.  Thus the Office’s 2006 orphan works 
proposal suggested limiting remedies when copyright owners are unlocatable, 
effectively freeing many works from the long tail of time.106  Similarly, the Office 
appreciates section 108(h), which allows libraries and archives to copy, distribute, 
display or perform any published work in its last twenty years of protection for 
purposes of preservation, scholarship or research.  Of course, other limitations on 
the law, including fair use, effectively offset term as well, albeit in limited 
circumstances. 
Perhaps the next great copyright act could take a new approach to term, not for 
the purpose of amending it downward, but for the purpose of injecting some 
balance into the equation.  More specifically, perhaps the law could shift the burden 
of the last twenty years from the user to the copyright owner, so that at least in 
some instances, copyright owners would have to assert their continued interest in 
exploiting the work by registering with the Copyright Office in a timely manner.107  
And if they did not, the works would enter the public domain.108 
2.  Making Room for Opt-outs 
The United States has long had opt-in licensing schemes that permit authors to 
license their exclusive rights by voluntarily opting into a collective management 
organization.  We have the examples of ASCAP, BMI and SESAC in the music 
industry and the Copyright Clearance Center in the literary space.109  In the words 
 
for works of authors, and it is incorporated in seventeen free trade agreements of the United States. 
 105. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 106. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 34. 
 107. If U.S. history with respect to renewal registration of copyright is any indication, very few 
copyright owners—in this context, heirs and successors in interest rather than the author herself—will 
actually do so.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STUDY NO. 31, supra note 9, at 220 (stating that, of works 
registered in 1931–1932, one third of musical compositions, 7% of books and 11% of periodicals had 
been renewed).  In contrast, a 2007 study by Stanford University found that an average of 30.8% of 
books published between 1923 and 1963 had their copyright registration renewed.  See STANFORD 
UNIV. LIBRARIES & ACADEMIC INFO. RES., ’23–’64 IMPRINT COPYRIGHT DETERMINATOR:  FINAL 
REPORT 4 (2007), available at http://collections.stanford.edu/copyrightrenewals/files/ FinalNarrative_ 
18Sept07.pdf. 
 108. This should not, as far as I can see, present insurmountable problems under international law.  
The Berne Convention requires a minimum term of life plus fifty years, defers to member states as to the 
treatment of their own citizens, and provides the term of protection of the country of origin for the works 
of foreign nationals.  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 
2, art. 7.  At the same time, copyright owners who choose to assert their continued interests would have 
the full benefit of the additional twenty years, subject to the requirement of additional registration.   
 109. Some collective management frameworks raise competition issues that would need to be 
reviewed and reconciled if collective licensing is part of the answer for consumers and market gridlock 
in the digital age.  For example, both ASCAP and BMI operate under consent decrees with the U.S. 
Department of Justice that are designed to protect licensees from price discrimination or other 
anticompetitive behavior.  Although the terms vary somewhat, under these consent decrees ASCAP and 
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of one professor, speaking here at Columbia just a couple of years ago, collective 
management organizations can be attractive because they “can put [the] Humpty 
Dumpty of rights back together again by allowing users to obtain all the rights 
necessary for a particular use.”110 
By contrast, opt-out systems reverse the general principle of copyright law that 
copyrighted works should be reproduced or disseminated only with the prior 
approval of the copyright owner.  It has become clear, however, that opt-out 
systems might serve the objectives of copyright law in some compelling 
circumstances, if appropriately tailored, fairly administered and created with 
oversight from Congress.  One potential opt-out system is a form of licensing 
known as extended collective licensing.  Extended collective licensing allows 
representatives of copyright owners and users to mutually agree to negotiate on a 
collective basis and then to negotiate terms that are binding on all members of the 
group by operation of law.  It has the potential to provide certainty for users and 
remuneration for copyright owners (for example, in mass digitization activities) but 
would provide some control to copyright owners wanting to opt out of the 
arrangement. 
Courts have affirmed the fact that fundamental changes like this are the domain 
of Congress, because Congress is designed to weigh the equities of the public 
interest and to craft broadly applicable policies.  A court, by contrast, must apply 
the facts and law as it finds them.  This is why the Supreme Court noted in Eldred 
v. Ashcroft that “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to 
pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives,”111 and why Judge Chin, in rejecting the 
proposed settlement between Google and a class of authors and publishers, said that 
“the establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more 
suited for Congress” than the courts.112  Among the questions Congress could 
consider are what kinds of uses might benefit from opt-out regimes (e.g., certain 
kinds of uses in higher education or certain kinds of library access), and what the 
actual terms and opt-out mechanisms should entail.113 
3.  Making the Law More Accessible 
Finally, as noted earlier, the copyright law has become progressively unreadable 
during the very time it has become increasingly pervasive. 
When the Copyright Act was enacted, it contained seventy-three sections, and 
the entire statute was fifty-seven pages long.  Today, it contains 137 sections and is 
 
BMI administer the public performance right for their members’ musical works on a nonexclusive basis 
and offer the same terms to similarly situated licensees.  See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, 
Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23707, (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 11, 2001); 
United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
18, 1994). 
 110. Daniel J. Gervais, Keynote:  The Landscape of Collective Management Schemes, 34 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 591, 599 (2011); see also MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 37. 
 111. 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003). 
 112. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 113. See generally MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 37. 
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280 pages long, nearly five times the size of the original.  As former Register 
Marybeth Peters observed in 2007, the current “copyright law reads like the tax 
code, and there are sections that are incomprehensible to most people and difficult 
to me.”114 
This is not merely a paradox; it is damaging to the rule of law.115  The next great 
copyright act should be as accessible as possible. 
III.  THE POLICY PROCESS 
As Congress considers copyright revision, its primary challenge will be keeping 
the public interest in the forefront of its thoughts, including how to define the 
public interest and who may speak for it.  Any number of organizations may feel 
justified in this role, and on many issues there may in fact be many voices, but 
there is no singular party or proxy. 
Because there are many more stakeholders than in previous revisions, it will be 
both harder and easier for Congress to weigh the issues.  Why revision will be 
difficult is obvious.  Not since the industrial revolution has there been a force like 
the Internet, and it has changed both the creation and dissemination of authorship.  
The copyright world, which once had predictable and even pristine demarcations, 
has morphed dramatically.116 
It is also difficult to separate the medium from the message.  As one journalist 
has observed, “[t]echnology executives like to suggest that media companies are 
selling buggy whips in the age of the automobile, but that doesn’t hold up. . . .  So 
far, content generated by online businesses can’t compete with that from traditional 
media companies.”117 
And then there is the common refrain that information wants to be free.  Free 
information is good for the Internet and serves legitimate and important free speech 
principles.  But in order to have a robust knowledge economy, we need content that 
is both professional and informal; we need content that consists of information, 
commentary and entertainment (or sometimes all of these combined into one), and 
 
 114. Rob Pegoraro, Debating the Future of Music, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2007), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2007/09/debating_the_future_of_music.html. 
 115. The Section 108 Study Group found that many practitioners are confused by the basic 
organization of the library exception.  See SECTION 108 STUDY GRP., THE SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP 
REPORT ix–x, 93–94 (2008), available at http://www.section108.gov/docs/ Sec108StudyGroupReport 
.pdf.  The same is true in the world of musical works and compulsory licenses, which are supposed to 
replace a dysfunctional market, but not at the expense of usability.  Sections 114 and 115 are highly 
technical and confusing:  new business entrants and even established users struggle with interpreting the 
language, which is perhaps appropriately the subject of criticism.  And then there is the Kirtsaeng case, 
in which the Supreme Court was asked to interpret the phrase “lawfully made under this title”—five 
words that appear in five different sections of the Copyright Act—which has sparked intense debate 
over the first sale doctrine, importation, and geographical licensing.  See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., No.11-697 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013). 
 116. See Leyland Pitt et al., Changing Channels:  The Impact of the Internet on Distribution 
Strategy, 42 BUS. HORIZONS 19 (1999). 
 117. ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE:  HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE 
BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 9 (2012). 
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we need content that is licensed, content that is free, or in some cases, content that 
is licensed for free. 
Although challenging, it is possible that Congress may actually find a world 
order like this to be more manageable in the long run.  If the lines of corporate 
interests have blurred, if many actors have interrelated objectives, if many revenue 
models are decentralized, and if many advocacy or consumer groups are tied to one 
special interest or another, including through funding, then the sum of these 
concerns may well approximate the greater goals of copyright law. 
Of course, government actors also have equities in copyright law and would be 
essential to the deliberation process of a general revision.  As discussed above, the 
Copyright Office has a long history and deep expertise in the copyright law, has a 
direct advisory relationship with Congress, and has responsibilities for 
administering many copyright provisions.118  The Office also interacts with many 
other agencies on a daily basis, which in turn have specific perspectives and 
statutory roles.  This is how U.S. intellectual property policy works at the 
government level, and it is another reflection of the public interest.119 
I would like to leave the topic of process by stating something that I hope is 
uncontroversial.  The issues of authors are intertwined with the interests of the 
public.  As the first beneficiaries of the copyright law, authors are not a 
counterweight to the public interest but are instead at the very center of the 
equation.  In the words of the Supreme Court, “[t]he immediate effect of our 
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.”120 
Congress has a duty to keep authors in its mind’s eye, including songwriters, 
book authors, filmmakers, photographers and visual artists.  Indeed, “[a] rich 
culture demands contributions from authors and artists who devote thousands of 
hours to a work and a lifetime to their craft.”121  A law that does not provide for 
authors would be illogical—hardly a copyright law at all.  And it would not deserve 
the respect of the public. 
This does not mean that all authors want identical legal treatment.  On the 
contrary, the diversity of authorship is part of the fun when it comes to copyright 
law, and the law should be accommodating.  For example, some authors prefer 
 
 118. See 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). 
 119. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office conducted a “listening tour” in 2008 and, with the 
greater Department of Commerce, is preparing a comprehensive discussion document (a green paper) on 
copyright issues in the digital environment.  The National Academy of Sciences is preparing a report 
that examines research methodology in the context of copyright policy.  See Copyright in the Digital 
Era:  Building Evidence for Policy, BOARD ON SCI., TECH. & ECON. POL’Y, http:// sites.national 
academies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (describing the project).  
The Department of Justice, the State Department, the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator and 
other parts of the White House, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative also interact 
with the copyright system and the Copyright Office in one way or another.  
 120. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 121. Scott Turow, Paul Aiken & James Shapiro, Would the Bard Have Survived the Web?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A29. 
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receiving credit to receiving payment, and some embrace the philosophy and 
methodology of Creative Commons, where authors may provide advance 
permission to users or even divest themselves of rights.122  The law must be 
flexible enough to accommodate these decisions. 
IV.  EVOLUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
Before I conclude, I would like to turn back to the Copyright Office itself.  The 
Office has been at the epicenter of both the policy and the administration of 
copyright law since 1897 by virtue of its statutory duties, its close relationship with 
Congress, and its placement and origins in the national library.  The Office has 
grown organically, meaning its functions today were no more planned or 
imaginable at the turn of the twentieth century than was the explosion of the 
copyright system itself.  Congress simply handed the Office things over time, both 
by design and by default. 
The expertise of the Office is reflected in countless contributions over the last 
hundred years, including official studies, congressional hearings, treaty 
negotiations, trade agreements, policy recommendations and legal interpretations, 
not to mention in the Copyright Act and its legislative history and in opinions of the 
courts. 
Of course there is always more to do, and although Congress has long relied 
upon the expertise of the Copyright Office, it has been slow to increase the Office’s 
regulatory role.123  In fact, from 1897 to 1998, the role was largely, though not 
entirely, administrative, meaning most regulations addressed administrative 
questions, i.e., rules pertaining to the registration process, the collection of fees, 
and the administration of certain aspects of compulsory licenses.124  As more than 
one professor has noted, the Office has had very little opportunity to apply its 
expertise, leading Congress to write too much detail into the code on matters that 
are constantly changing, such as economic conditions and technology.125 
Evolving the Copyright Office should be a major goal of the next great 
copyright act.  In short, it is difficult to see how a twenty-first century copyright 
law could function well without a twenty-first century agency.126  To the extent that 
 
 122. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
 123. See Terry Hart, Copyright Reform Step Zero, 19 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 147 (2010) (noting 
that copyright law will become increasingly unable to keep up with technological and other challenges 
while also becoming increasingly resistant to reform efforts). 
 124. Some aspects of regulating compulsory licenses and registration have substantive impact, e.g. 
provisions relating to the application of section 115 to online streaming.  See Compulsory License for 
Making and Distributing Phonorecords, Including Digital Phonorecord Deliveries, 73 Fed. Reg. 66, 173 
(Nov. 7, 2008). 
 125. See Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 93, 95–99 (2004) (suggesting that 
one of the reasons copyright provisions became obsolete is the lack of regulatory power in the Copyright 
Office); see also Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Conversations with Renowned Professors on the Future of 
Copyright, 12 TUL. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 65 (2009) (noting that “the Copyright Office is a 
rather unique entity because historically, it has not had much regulatory power”) (quoting Professor 
Diane Zimmerman). 
 126. The Constitution permits Congress to delegate certain activities to agencies under certain 
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patent law offers any guidance, it is notable that the importance of the legal and 
business functions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has been acknowledged 
over time, most recently through the amendments of the America Invents Act of 
2011.127 
In truth, many constituents want the Copyright Office to do better the things it 
already does, and to do a host of new things to help make the copyright law more 
functional.128  For example, some people would like the Office to administer 
enforcement proceedings (such as a small copyright claims tribunal), offer 
arbitration or mediation services to resolve questions of law or fact (for example, 
where rights are murky or a license is unclear), issue advisory opinions (for 
example, on questions of fair use129), and engage in educational activities (like 
promulgating best practices or providing copyright guidance to teachers).  The 
Office might also play a role in ensuring the governance or transparency of critical 
twenty-first century actors, such as content registries or collective licensing 
organizations. 
There are some practical obstacles.  Although migrating the Copyright Office to 
the next generation of services is a primary focus of Office staff at this time,130 
 
circumstances, provided that the delegation is not an end run around the distinct roles of the legislative 
and executive branches when it comes to deliberating upon and signing new laws.  Justice Blackmun 
explained: 
[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, 
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives. . . .  Accordingly, this Court has deemed it “constitutionally sufficient if Congress 
clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of 
this delegated authority.” 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (internal citation omitted).  The Justices have 
made it clear that in applying such authority, an agency may “exercise judgment on matters of policy,” 
including “the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the 
statutory standards” as well as “the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed 
statutory framework.”  Id. at 378–79 (internal citation omitted); see also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1341–42 (D.C. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-926 
(U.S. Jan. 25, 2013) (concluding that the Library “is a freestanding entity that clearly meets the 
definition of ‘Department’” for purposes of the Appointments Clause and that the Library and the 
Copyright Royalty Board have the power to promulgate copyright regulations, to apply the statute to 
affected parties, and to set rates and terms on a case by case basis). 
 127. For example, the statute authorizes the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to deposit a portion 
of patent and trademark fees into a reserve fund, which the Office may access and spend as needed to 
run its operations, irrespective of its annual appropriations from Congress.  See Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.).  
 128. See, e.g., Michael Weinberg et al., A Copyright Office for the 21st Century:  
Recommendations to the New Register of Copyrights, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/ACopyrightOfficeforthe21stCentury.pdf. 
 129. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1123 (2007) (proposing 
the establishment of a Fair Use Board within the U.S. Copyright Office to render advisory opinions on 
whether proposed uses of copyrighted works are fair).  Some communities have begun to create and 
adopt fair use practices independently.  See, e.g., Fair Use, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use.  
 130. The Office is in the process of evaluating potential improvements and technical enhancements 
to the information technology platforms that support its registration and recordation functions, including 
its online registration system.  The Office has identified a number of key focus areas, including 
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much will depend on technical capacity and resources.131  Moreover, not everyone 
is optimistic about the future of the Copyright Office.  As recently as 2010, a group 
known as the Copyright Principles Project discussed the Office in meetings it held 
in Berkeley.  It wrote: 
The information that the Office currently collects and administers as part of the 
registration system is the kind that everyone expects to be accessible through 
something like a simple web search.  More importantly, transactions involving 
copyrighted works often take place in the same hyper-efficient environment, and the 
parties to those transactions require access to copyright information at a speed and in a 
format that matches that efficiency.  While the Office has observed and anticipated 
these developments and moved many of its functions and services online, the reality is 
that the functionality of the registry remains woefully behind what leading-edge 
search and database technologies permit.132 
The Copyright Office agrees that a twenty-first century copyright law requires a 
twenty-first century agency. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is a point of pride for the United States that our past great copyright laws have 
served the nation so well.  American experts are fond of pointing out that we have 
the most balanced copyright law in the world, as well as a robust environment of 
free expression and an equally robust copyright economy.133 
 
improved system navigation and user interface, application of mobile technologies, improved process 
tracking, enhanced search capabilities, and bulk data transfer (often called “business-to-business” or 
“system-to-system”) capabilities.  See Technological Upgrades to Registration and Recordation 
Functions, 78 Fed. Reg. 17,722 (Mar. 22, 2013).  
 131. As an agency that supports both the marketplace and the nation’s cultural heritage, the 
Copyright Office is a bargain.  However, it will need more resources to support the needs of the twenty-
first century.  Currently, two-thirds of the Office’s budget (less than $40 million) comes directly from 
spending authority, i.e., congressional approval to spend the fees the Office collects for registration and 
other services to copyright owners.  These revenues are nowhere near the revenues generated by the 
patent system, but they reflect the fact that registration is optional.  One-third of the budget, 
approximately $15 to $18 million, comes from appropriated monies and helps fund public services that 
are for the benefit of the public at large—for example, the public records of copyright ownership, 
expiration and transfers.  These appropriated dollars should be further reviewed against another public 
benefit, the hundreds of thousands of deposits provided to the Library’s collection at a value of $30 
million per year. 
 132. Pamela Samuelson et al., Copyright Principles Project:  Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1175, 1203 (2010).  The Project also queried whether registration should be decentralized 
and delegated to a series of private sector registries, with the Copyright Office moving to a new role of 
setting standards, both technical and legal. 
 133. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN 
THE U.S. ECONOMY:  THE 2011 REPORT 4 (2011), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/ 
2011CopyrightIndustriesReport.PDF (reporting that total copyright industries contributed $1.627 trillion 
to the U.S. economy in 2010, which accounted for 11.10% of total GDP); THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW 
SZAMOSSZEGI, COMPUTER & COMMC’NS INDUS. ASS’N, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:  ECONOMIC 
CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 6 (2011), available at http:// 
www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000526/CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-
2011.pdf (reporting that industries relying on fair use contributed an average of $2.4 trillion to the U.S. 
economy in 2008 and 2009, which accounted for approximately 17% of total U.S. GDP). 
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Still, no law is perfect.  The 1976 Act, which was a fair and remarkable 
achievement by many accounts, did not come close to the bleeding edge of 
technology.  When all was said and done, Barbara Ringer acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the new law, calling it “a good 1950 copyright law.”134  “[I]t may 
be resilient enough to serve the public interest for some time to come,” she said, 
“[b]ut some of its inadequacies are already becoming apparent, and no prophet is 
needed to foretell the need for substantial restructuring of our copyright system 
before the end of this century.”135 
Unfinished business may be difficult for policy experts, but it is not always a 
terrible thing.  In a framework as dynamic as copyright, it is not unreasonable and 
is probably prudent for Members of Congress to legislate carefully in response to 
technological innovation rather than in real time.  Congress needs to see the 
evolution of technology and related businesses with some objectivity and to 
consider, as appropriate, the rulings and the frustrations of the courts before it can 
move forward.  When it is ready to move, however, Congress should do so with 
both great deference to the principles of the past and great vision for the future. 
In closing, I would like to encourage Congress and all of you here tonight not 
only to think about copyright law but to think big, perhaps by harnessing all of the 
vision, commitment, impatience, concern and optimism of the nation’s former 
Registers. The next great copyright act is as possible as it is exciting.  Most 
importantly, it would serve the public interest. 
 
 134. Barbara Ringer, Authors’ Rights in the Electronic Age:  Beyond the Copyright Act of 1976, 1 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981). 
 135. Id. 
